The Delegates Lounge

A French Political Scientist Responds to the Trump Shockwave

• The Delegates Lounge LLC • Season 2 • Episode 2

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Get ready to explore the turbulent waters of transatlantic relations with our guest, French political scientist Celia Berlin. Discover how the Trump administration's controversial actions, including remarks from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance, have sent ripples across Europe, particularly in response to the tensions over Ukraine. With President Macron at the helm, rallying European leaders to counter these shifts, Celia provides a nuanced perspective on the strategic and emotional dynamics at play in European capitals as they brace for potentially profound changes in US foreign policy.

We'll navigate the shifting political currents within Europe, where figures like Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen are recalibrating their positions in light of global developments. As we dissect the responses from the far-right, including Germany's AfD and France's Reconquête, you'll gain insight into how these parties are juggling admiration for Trump with the real-world implications of his alignment with Kremlin narratives. The episode also delves into JD Vance's incendiary address at the Munich Security Conference, sparking dialogue on free speech, political realignments, and the future of European security.

As we round out our discussion, we'll confront the broader implications of a potential second Trump administration on the transatlantic alliance, exploring how European leaders are responding to the existential question of strategic autonomy. From Macron's calls for a European army to the historical context of French skepticism towards NATO, we assess Europe's readiness to assert its significance in global affairs amid unsettling US rhetoric. Immerse yourself in this comprehensive examination of a relationship under strain and the strategies European leaders are employing to navigate these uncharted waters.

Speakers:
J. Alex Tarquinio (host). @alextarquinio of @delegateslounge on X.
https://foreignpolicy.com/author/j-alex-tarquinio/

Célia Belin, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head
of its Paris office (guest). @celiabelin on X.
https://ecfr.eu/profile/celia-belin/

References:
The host has quoted the guest in the following Foreign Policy articles.
Macron’s China Trip Is a Fool’s Errand
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/06/macron-france-china-visit-pension-protests/
Putin’s War is Shaking Up the French Election
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/10/russia-war-france-elections-macron/
The Education of Pap Ndiaye
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/17/france-politics-culture-war-education-pap-ndiaye-education-minister/

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Welcome to the Delegates Lounge. Pull up a chair. I'm Alex Tarquinio, a journalist based at the United Nations here in New York City and your emcee for this podcast featuring some of the most influential minds in the world today. Settle in for some riveting tete-a-tete, available wherever you listen to podcasts. Welcome back.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

It feels as if the Trump administration is trying to put the lights out all over Europe by switching off the transatlantic alliance. Fortunately, our guest in this episode is an expert on transatlantic relations. As a French political scientist, she sheds light on the thinking in European capitals. Newly minted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth landed the first blow of President Donald Trump's one, two, three punch At last week's meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Brussels, where he rattled off a litany of concessions that he said Ukraine should make to Russia. Critics accused him of squandering a strong American hand in any future negotiations.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

In rapid succession, vice President JD Vance administered the second shock with his Valentine's Day speech in Munich, where at times he seemed to mistake the annual security conference for the national prayer breakfast. It was no Valentine's Day message, unless you're thinking of the St Valentine's Day massacre. Vance had been expected to lay out the administration's vision for ending the war, but instead took the opportunity to deliver a blistering attack on European democracies. Trump didn't need to leave his southern White House, mar-a-lago, to inflict the third blow. After a long chat with Vladimir Putin, trump reiterated a number of Kremlin talking points. He called Zelensky a dictator without elections on social media and during a speech in Florida. That's a favorite Kremlin talking point, by the way, but Ukraine's constitution forbids elections during martial law. It's not uncommon for countries to suspend elections during wartime, and Britain pointed out that it did so during the Second World War. Putin has been remarkably quiet throughout this period. Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake, a quote widely attributed to Napoleon.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

The White House has ordered the Pentagon to prepare for far-reaching budget cuts. If implemented over the next five years, these would bring US defense expenditures down from 3.4 percent of the gross domestic product to around 2 percent. Ironically, trump has belittled NATO allies for spending 2% of their GDP on defense and said they should be spending 5%. In an era when Beijing and Moscow are dramatically increasing their defense outlays, it's becoming clear this administration wants to reduce the American military footprint.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

The next act in this drama may well play out on my stomping ground, the UN headquarters, this coming Monday, february 24th, the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UN General Assembly is scheduled to vote on a draft resolution reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. A diplomatic source told me this morning that so far more than 50 countries have agreed to co-sponsor the draft resolution, but there's deep suspicion that the United States might not be among the co-sponsors on Monday. That would be a dramatic turn of events. Former United States Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield and her team were instrumental in rounding up votes for previous resolutions supporting Ukraine. That's worth keeping an eye on.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Critics have compared Trump's recent performance with Neville Chamberlain in Munich 1938. But that's unfair to the memory of Chamberlain. Historians believe the British prime minister clearly understood that his country wasn't militarily prepared to face off against Nazi Germany in 1938, and his policy of appeasement was meant to buy time while Britain rearmed. But Chamberlain never publicly heaped praise on Adolf Hitler, never bragged about his close personal relationship with the Fuhrer. Many Europeans feel traumatized. Macron invited on short notice a number of European leaders for an informal emergency session on Monday at the Elysee, the French presidential palace. Two days later he pulled together an even larger gathering of leaders in a video conference that included more Eastern Europeans who are neighbors or near neighbors of Russia, as well as Canada's Prime Minister, justin Trudeau. Macron's second meeting on Wednesday coincided with my conversation with our guest in this episode.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Celia Berlin is a Senior Foreign Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of its Paris office From 2017 to 2022,. She was a visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institution in Washington DC. We've spoken often over the years and I've quoted her occasionally in my articles in Foreign Policy there. I've said it, so I'll include those links in the show notes, as I always do when I mention articles my own and others. Celia gave an unvarnished view from the other side of the pond on how the Trump administration remarks are splintering the previously solid oak transatlantic relationship. Here's our conversation.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Celia Bilan, thank you so much for joining us in the Delegates' Lounge. We are very pleased and honored to have your perspectives from Paris about all of the changes we have been seeing recently. Welcome to the Delegates' Lounge, thank you. I'm very happy to be here. Well, we're happy to have you. You have a perspective, particularly from the point of view of Paris. You're a French political scientist. You've also spent a fair amount of time, of course, in Washington and Brookings, so you can talk about both French and American politics and transatlantic relations. I want to start out by getting your view from 36,000 feet, post-munich conference and also all that we've seen in the new Trump administration what appears as a rapprochement with Putin and some of the concern of some other allies. What have you been hearing from your European colleagues? How they're responding to this really massive change in transatlantic relations?

Celia Belin:

So thank you for the question. There are two ways to answer that. The one way is to look at you know whether governments have been prepared or Europeans are taking into account the new changes to make different policies. But the other level is the emotional level, and I would say on the first part, the part that is more policy oriented there had been preparation in Europe for the possibility of a second Trump administration. It had been envisaged.

Celia Belin:

Quite a few teams at all level of governments in European countries had been working on different scenarios scenarios on trade, scenarios on Ukraine, scenarios that included this possible rapprochement with Russia, and so in some ways there is a level-headedness and you know a sense of that this was coming and that Europeans would be prepared for it.

Celia Belin:

But the truth is is that there's also an emotional level and that it's one thing to sort of imagine a scenario developing. It's something else when it actually happens in front of your very eyes. And I think this is the shock that came out of the first few weeks of the Trump administration, including at the Munich Security Conference, including at the Munich Security Conference with the speech of Vice President JD Vance, but also with President Trump's phone call with Putin and his dismissal of Zelensky. All of this is really taking shape now and we have to reckon the fact that this is an entirely different America, that it will advance at light speed in all directions, including internal, and that, you know, europe, for whatever preparation they may have done, it will never have been enough, because it will go so extremely fast that we have to, you know, pick up pace as well. So there's this emotional element that is very strong and I must say it permeates all the conversation, even the ones that are trying to be as pragmatic as possible.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

And many European parties on the left and right, both in France and elsewhere in Europe. For example, in Germany, there were some on the left and right that appeared to have, shall we say, a better opinion of Putin and of Russia than the more centrist parties. You know you have Melenchon on the left and Le Pen on the right who've spoken with some admiration of Putin, and I should mention, with Le Pen, she did moderate that somewhat after the full scale invasion. Is there any sense on the far left and the far right in Europe that they're welcoming this change or, now that the rubber has hit the road, so to speak, that there's a real possibility that the US withdraws some of its security support for Europe? You know, are any of those opinions by people on the left and the right moderating now that they're faced with more of the reality?

Celia Belin:

So, I think we really have to distinguish here far left and far right and the difference between the two in the way they might have embraced Russia at times or Putin, in the way they might have embraced Russia at times or Putin. If you look at the far left and in France, france Insoumise, in particular Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has had at times, you know, kind words for Vladimir Putin. It stems out very much of a sort of third worldism perspective or the idea that the American global order was militaristic, was predatory, that it was supportive of sort of alternative to the domination of the West in many ways. And now that you know a Trump would align with a Putin. In any case it doesn't make sense anymore for protecting the little guy. These groups are being quiet at the moment and definitely not in support of Trump. They are highly critical of Trump's economic policies, trump's trade policies, extremely critical of Elon Musk, trump's trade policies, extremely critical of Elon Musk, extremely doubtful of the sort of libertarianism that is emanating from this government. So all these groups will not be inclined to support this new rapprochement and will feel probably, you know, it will probably even tame some of the interests they might have had in the past for Russia. But it's a different story.

Celia Belin:

On the far right and with all its variety across Europe and there you also have to distinguish, I think, between two groups. One is more of an ideological far right. That you know. I think that JD Vance, vice President Vance, talked to when he addressed the crowd, or talked about when he addressed the crowd in a Munich security conference and sort of voiced his support for this ideological conservative ultra-right that is very, very enthused with the sort of strong-armed, you know, broligarchy that is emanating from Washington, the rapprochement with Putin. They see, you know the liberal West as the morally corrupt. They see, they value the fight against immigration and even against immigrants. Sometimes Some of these far-right parties, such as the AFD in Germany or Reconquête in France, eric Zemmour's party, are just applauding. They're applauding Putin, they're applauding Trump, musk, etc. They're really darlings of this movement.

Celia Belin:

And I would say there's another crowd, maybe a crowd that seeks power, a crowd that you know, in some ways Melanie belongs to because she's in power, she's close to Musk, she wants to be in the good graces of Trump, but she also wants to stick, you know, has influence in European politics. She does not want to alienate all of her European partners immediately. She doesn't want to be Viktor Orban, so she's at the moment, uncomfortably trying to play a bit of both sides. And then another sort of pragmatism, maybe a sovereignist, nationalistic approach, is the Rassemblement National, the national rally in France, which you know is supportive of this patriotic, populist movement of the ultra-right all over Europe, but is also really mindful of the fact that some of Trump's trade policies will come back and bite us and be really tough on France and maybe tough on French workers, that Trump will exert pressure on France to do X, y and Z, and fundamentally, these parties are sovereignists. What they really aim for is to be sovereign.

Celia Belin:

Y and Z, and fundamentally these parties are sovereignists. What they really aim for is to be sovereign from Europe, but also sovereign from the US. They probably want to see a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia and are not losing any sleep over it, but fundamentally, the idea is that they don't want to fight for or to support Ukraine anymore. That's the main angle. So you see, there's like variety all across Europe and even though the Trump administration is really trying to rally in a sort of reactionary international, as Macron said, they might have, you know, political groups that are not as enthusiastic as others.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

That's a very nuanced analysis of European reactions across the political spectrum.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Now you mentioned JD Vance's remarks at the beginning of the Munich Security Conference.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

His essentially dressing down of European political and military leaders present there almost it came across almost like a schoolmarm calling them.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

They were really bad boys and girls, and he had like two different criticisms, primary criticisms.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

One was on free speech or their interpretation of free speech, where he plucked this one example of someone who had been praying outside of an abortion clinic, and that to me felt like it was really primarily aimed at the US domestic audience, who may have gotten outtakes of his speech.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

They're unlikely to have heard the entire speech, but they might have seen that play on social media, and obviously part of the Trump administration's electoral support came from those conservatives who are opposed to abortion. So it was still odd that he plucked that example out at a conference that's aimed at security policy. The other thing, though, is he particularly accused Germany which of course has this imminent election at the time of the Munich Security Conference, where many countries are sensitive to what might happen in the polls in a few days and accused them of not giving a fair break to the AfD, the Alternative for Germany, which other German political parties have said they wouldn't include in a coalition government. Traditionally, world leaders try to avoid discussing other countries' domestic politics in general and particularly try and avoid talking about their internal elections right before polling, first of all. Can you think of any other example?

Celia Belin:

No, someone was mentioning to me that the speech that Putin gave at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 was very geopolitical, not on domestic politics, but felt the same kind of earth shattering and alienating to the audience presence in the room. When you try to basically redraw, you destroy the consensus that prevailed and you sort of redraw new lines and shed new lights. But I can't think of this type of political interference before because indeed this has only been done when the free world or the liberal world order or the liberal West was pushing and criticizing and is criticizing authoritarian dictators, or is criticizing when during the Cold War, was criticizing the Soviet Union and the regime, or is still criticizing, you know, illiberal, autocratic regime around the world, illiberal autocratic regime around the world. And the fact of seeing an American president do that from the inside to its own allies and go inside, you know, talking about its own system but about allied political system and ways of government is, I don't know if it's completely unprecedented, but it's definitely shocking and striking.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Yeah, I mean, first of all, those are very telling comparisons that you came up with on the spur of the moment, but it is. It does seem to me that there's a distinction between trying to influence broad geostrategic changes and clearly that's at the base of JD Vance's remarks. The Trump administration clearly prefers the right-wing parties in Europe and he's made no secret of his support, for example, for the AFD candidate. But there's a difference between broadly trying to influence a realignment and actually trying to say things to influence an election that is days away in a foreign country that also happens to be a long-standing ally.

Celia Belin:

Yeah, that's the part, that's, that's that's saying right, it's the fact that it's a long, long-standing allies and and a fully, fully fledged democracy and with the values shared, because otherwise, you know, the US or even other Western countries would have no problem criticizing the election or the you know of this and that leader advancing a political agenda. But if I can be a bit of a contrarian here, I've been told by Trumpist affiliates, people who support the Trump administration, that one I've been given this example twice by them that you know, europeans did not refrain from criticizing the domestic affairs of the US and that we are the ones moralizing the United States constantly. And they gave this example of the European Parliament voting to condemn the overturn of Roe v Wade in the wake of the Supreme Court decision to overturn it and replace it. And the European Parliament added to this condemnation, of course, their own, you know, support for abortion services in Europe, etc. Even though there's many, many nuances on the European continent actually on that topic.

Celia Belin:

But the idea that European lawmakers would send a signal on, ultimately, a very domestic affair was taken as a point of argument, saying, well, you've been lecturing us for decades, so they haven't given me other examples, but at least that's the sentiment they're going with, that this sort of ultra-right, republican, conservative trend in USS politics has felt alienated. And now you know they're in power, they have the tools, they can be the one lecturing Europe and they have no shame over this. So I don't think there's a moral equivalency here, but I think that they feel it's the case.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

That's a valid point. On their concern, there has been a lot of European criticism of political developments in the United States. But yeah, that sounds like a parliamentary decision criticizing a political decision in another country. Also, the US Supreme Court is obviously a separate branch of government and obviously it's not going to be influenced by anything, but that does still appear to me to be different. Whether a head of state or government or, in this case, a vice president, who's next in line. Extremely, it's political interference.

Celia Belin:

I was just trying to maybe explain a bit of the justification that they are using to engage in this, but clearly, since the beginning of this administration, they see no problem into pushing actively for supporting the type of European leaders that they want to see in power in order to advance their agenda, their agenda of transforming the liberal democracies that we know of into versions that are way more conservative, more in line with what they perceive to be their interest.

Celia Belin:

And so that, I think, was the shock for the audience at the Munich Security Conference, the shock of a new world where the United States is now treating its closest allies as foreign powers which you would hope would change in order to be closer to your own interests. And that's just massive. And I think this happened during the same week when Donald Trump made a phone call to Vladimir Putin, when Donald Trump heavily criticized Zelensky, when Pete Hecht, the new Secretary of Defense, explained that the objective was a ceasefire, not almost, whatever the conditions, it's a change of footing for the US. That is massive and its allies are barely coping with it.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

The Trump administration and JD Vance refer to any criticism of disinformation as repression of free speech. But then, on the other hand, you have Donald Trump himself repeating, effectively, talking points that the Kremlin has put out on social media for well, certainly throughout the full-scale invasion, if not longer, and I should tell for the benefit of listeners that we're speaking about an hour after Donald Trump sent this very lengthy tweet actually screenshot tweet on Wednesday February 19th, Actually screenshot tweet on Wednesday February 19th, Critical of Zelensky, basically repeating much of what Putin and the Kremlin has said. I won't get into all the specifics.

Celia Belin:

He calls him a modestly successful comedian accuses him of what says all kinds of numbers that clearly are inflated on what the US has spent and basically blamed Zelensky for the war. She accuses him of being a dictator and retaining elections because of the martial law. So he's accusing him.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

One thing we should point out is that the United Kingdom didn't have elections during World War II.

Celia Belin:

But not only that. I must say that the larger picture here is that with this rant and this position, he's also advocating for regime change in Kiev in many ways, and regime change is Putin's war objective. So he's advancing Putin's war objective by doing so.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

And aren't you saying that was the principal war objective? I mean also to take length, but when they went for Kiev three years ago. I mean, I don't think anyone really doubts, even supporters, that that was the objective.

Celia Belin:

Yes, it was the stated objective of Vladimir Putin to be done with what he called the neo-Nazi regime of Kyiv, and this is, in other words, exactly what Donald Trump just tweeted about.

Celia Belin:

So it's mind boggling.

Celia Belin:

We knew that this could happen, that some form of rationale will build up in Trump's circles, that there was an interest for him not to align fully on Russian interests, but at the current moment Trump seems to think otherwise that full alignment with Russians' views and talking points is in his interest.

Celia Belin:

I'm not sure how or why, but that's what he's coming up with and we have to realize, as Europeans we are left to be squeezed between these two narratives that turn out to be the same narrative, and that we have to continue holding up our side of the narrative that Ukraine has been invaded, that Ukraine is not the attacker here, it's the victim of Russia's invasion, that it's not the one that wants to pursue this war.

Celia Belin:

But it's also a war that it cannot lose for the sake of its existence, its sovereignty and for the sake of Europe's defense as well. So it's an extremely tough time we should not kid ourselves for transatlantic relations, for Europe, for Ukraine. Obviously Extremely tough time, but Europe will have to play with its strength and will have to put forward suggestions, will have to continue to demonstrate that it knows what it wants and that there's a good reason to do that, including for Americans' interests, that Americans' interests do not align fully with Russians' interests, and I think Europe has to make the case and state its own interest in doing so. But it's kind of scary.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Many European leaders clearly feel sidelined by the Trump administration in its ongoing conversations with Putin and his emissaries with Lavrov and others. On the other hand, the CEO of Germany's largest defense contractor, rheinmetall, recently said that Europe only had itself to blame for sitting at the kids' table, as he called it, because of chronic underinvestment in defense. Now we should acknowledge there's obviously some self-interest here. European defense contractor stocks have been up this week and actually last I checked US were down because there's some thought that Trump is going to use this to disinvest somewhat or to reduce the budget of the Pentagon and is across the board cost cutting, whereas Europe is going to invest more. So there is some self-interest in the CEO of the largest defense contractor in Germany saying this. But on the other hand, does he have a point? Is Europe quote unquote sitting at the kids table for a reason?

Celia Belin:

Yes, there has been structural under investment in defense for decades, even though these have picked up dramatically after Crimea in 2014, and obviously even more after Russia's invasion of Ukraine is concerned, germany has had to live with the historical burden of its crimes in World War II, and one way to solidify its own democracy has been to refuse to be militaristic and to believe in a liberal world order that would promote peace and security through trade and exchanges and security through trade and exchanges. Somehow Germany has been on the losing side of that bargain, because that's not how the world has evolved and it should have woken up much earlier to Russia's sort of return into the geopolitical competition. But don't we all wish right now that Germany's way would have been the best? You know, it would have meant a much better, much safer world.

Celia Belin:

So European leaders were gathered in Paris a couple of days ago to discuss after these declarations on Russia and Ukraine, to discuss how to react and, among the decisions taken, offering even more support to Ukraine or offering potentially security guarantees to Ukraine. One of the decisions is also to ramp up even more strongly defence spending and to try and encourage everyone to reach 2% of GDP in defence spending as quickly as possible, but basically to put in place the instruments that are needed for this ramping up to be also a European effort. So Europe builds itself in crises very often, europe has also invested in citizens' health or in the climate transition, or in education or in many other different ways that felt, and are still, very, very important to Europeans. So it was a political choice. I think now the pendulum is swinging back to more defense spending out of necessity, not out of choice, not out of the type of world we wanted to live in, but the type of world we are inheriting now.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Was Macron right about a strategic autonomy? I mean, is this a justification of his theory that Europe needs its own European army? Of course he famously referred to NATO as brain dead a few years ago, to NATO was brain dead a few years ago. Then, during the interim between the first and second Trump administration, he seemed to walk that back a little bit, implying perhaps that really he had been speaking about the US leadership under the Trump administration when he made the reference to NATO being brain dead. Was he right all along?

Celia Belin:

Yes, of course, To be fair, European strategic autonomy is not just a Macron idea.

Celia Belin:

It's been a French idea for decades.

Celia Belin:

Macron has even insisted even more on defence and to develop European strategic autonomy because fundamentally, it had it believed very deeply that, you know, American interests and European interests would not necessarily always align and in that case, when American interests were to be defended and, you know, when America was to make its own choices, such as invading Iraq, Europe decided.

Celia Belin:

Parts of Europe, including France and Germany, decided not to follow and to criticize that decision. On the opposite side, Europe may have wanted to take some foreign policy initiative for which the US was not necessarily supportive. So that's why the French felt it was important to be able to stand partly on their own two feet, but at the same time, it recognized that because of lack of investment, but also because the US had, technologically were very advanced and still very needed in a whole range of enablers, strategic enablers it was even better to be together, you know, in a NATO format, really working hand in hand. Macron, I think, fundamentally during the Biden years, believed in pushing European strategic autonomy while at the same time showing itself to be a really good NATO ally, so doing both at the same time. Reinforcing Europe within NATO, for example, was one of the elements that France was supporting.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

It's a very fine line to walk. And of course you mentioned Chirac. Jacques Chirac was, I'm sure our listeners will remember, a very fierce opponent of the second Iraq war. But on the other hand France has always kind of had on and off again opinions of NATO. It was in the command structure, then it left the command structure, then it was back in the command structure. So I guess we're saying is perhaps that's an inherently French skepticism.

Celia Belin:

Yeah, that's so. You have these historical reasons. But but one element that has changed there. So you know, france was always the one that you know dragging its feet sometimes into being fully transatlantic partner, or sometimes yes, some elements were critical of NATO or not, or pushing a little bit too much the European side rather than pushing the transatlantic side, but by and large, it was always there within the alliance.

Celia Belin:

It supported the US after 9-11. It worked with the US in Libya. It was there in Syria, even if it was aborted as a mission. It was there during the whole ISIS campaign, etc. Etc. So there's no shortage. And the US were there to support France in its military intervention in Mali, etc. There's no shortage of example of how well these two countries have worked together, and together with Europe as well. So, whatever the speech on European strategic autonomy, it has never prevented France or Europe to work very closely with the US. What has changed, however, is that now it's the US that have become the unreliable partner, become the unreliable partner From the first Trump administration. That when you know already sowing doubt into Article 5 or US commitment to its NATO allies, then you know the Biden administration swings in the other direction, back, being very forceful in its support of Europe, of Ukraine, great ally, you know, great solidarity, and now we're back to a way worse situation with really high American skepticism.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

So these swings are gigantic and it's hard to Now, it's the US as an unreliable partner. I don't know if you're saying something similar about France, because of course France, like other NATO countries, as I think our listeners will know, the only time Article 5 has really been invoked was after the 9-11 attacks. French forces were in the war in Afghanistan from what 2001 to 2014.

Celia Belin:

They did not join the war in Iraq, but that's the only one.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

It's not that they didn't support Article 5 or they didn't support the United States. He drew a line in the sand, so to speak. You're not drawing the comparison there between the US skeptical of Ukraine then, the US supporting Ukraine during Biden and now.

Celia Belin:

No, on the contrary, I think it's from Ukraine.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

I mean, you're not saying that the Chirac's decision about Iraq was comparable to that. I just want to make that clear.

Celia Belin:

No, no, no. On the contrary, I think that France, even though it has always vocalized Europe's strategic autonomy discourse and pushed for more investment in European defense all the while and during the whole time, has been a steadfast and reliable NATO ally to the US All of decades, has never wavered fundamentally in the ideas of collective defense of NATO and has been also present in a wide variety of military intervention or even just as political support for the US. It's not about disagreeing on this or that decision to proceed, etc. We are talking about something completely different. Now that the Trump administration is putting into question is the alliance itself. So thankfully, there has been no conversation on NATO just yet and I don't want to push that conversation now.

Celia Belin:

But the idea that the American president has now taken the perspective of Russia in the biggest land war that Europe has known since the end of the Second World War and that this new American president comes in and takes the perspective of the adversary and pushes for the adversary's interest, it's just of a completely different nature. It's not just about being a grumpy ally there. It's about fundamentally changing the sides on which we're standing. So it's still early. I wish we could hope that these are mere negotiation tactics, that the Trump administration will realize that the American interest is not fully aligned on Russian interest, that it will understand that it's important as well to take the perspective of allies.

Celia Belin:

But the first, the early signs coming out of this administration are deeply worrying, and I think that's where we are now. We're still extremely early in this administration, so I don't want to pass definite judgment, because that makes no sense whatsoever. I'm just reflecting on the past month that has everyone really on edge at this moment in Europe and really hoping that we can accommodate a way to proceed that does not rupture entirely our relationship to the US, that protects NATO and the interests of the transatlantic allies, that protects the existence and sovereignty of Ukraine, and that we find some form of agreement around these most basic principles that we, up until now, we thought we shared with the US.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

So Ukraine obviously is the topic A, I would guess, in Europe this week. But I want to talk a little bit more broadly about sovereignty. And there is a question of sovereignty there because the details we're hearing about the deal that they tried to get President Zelensky to sign they have been compared to reparations that were demanded by Germany in Versailles. But obviously in this case they're not being asked of the aggressor, but more broadly about sovereignty, which is according to the United Nations Charter. Un countries are supposed to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of other states. So not only is Ukraine's sovereignty very clearly being challenged, but comments that Trump made both before and after he took office about, for example, greenland a territory of Denmark, that's EU territory and also another NATO ally, canada, that are somewhat hostile and threatening. Is this also something that concerns Europeans, that the United States, which has been the champion of sovereignty and territorial integrity for these eight decades since World War II? Is that a concern as well?

Celia Belin:

The US commitment to sovereignty of other countries when it's perceived that its existential interests were threatened, such as in the case of Iraq, even if mistaken, they II, when it made choices on other countries' sovereignty as well. But what's incredibly shocking is that we are talking about nations at peace, nations that are neighboring, nations that are allies, trading partners, closest to the United States as any other nation, and the type of predatory engagement that this administration is doing, or this president, with this country is baffling. I don't even know how to describe it. It's so imperialistic. It dates back from another century, 19th century type of doctrine where that can imagine that you know, as long as a territory has natural resources, it is up for grabs by the most powerful nation that borders it.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

And you're thinking particularly of Canada, of Denmark, canada, greenland, both. Yeah, it really applies to both.

Celia Belin:

Which is, I suppose that's what it's all about. But it is so incredibly insulting to Canadians, to Danes, to Greenlanders that the American president would say you know, we should just integrate that country. How can this be remotely OK? I have heard from Canadian friends and experts that they are incredibly mad about this, as they should be, and not just worried but very, very, very furious about it.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Well, there is a long shared history. Obviously, they fought side by side in many wars. I mean really all the major wars you know, from the last century to the present. They're also, of course, a huge trading partner, and I remember conservatives, republicans in the US not so long ago were fighting tooth and nail to get the pipeline, you know, and they wanted more trade with Canada and you know they were critical of, you know, environmentalists or whatever that opposed the Keystone pipeline. And now they're actually threatening higher tariffs and trying to reduce trade with Canada. So that's another abrupt switch.

Celia Belin:

So I suppose part of the method is the provocation is to go in the most outlandish way and threaten and have maximalist threats in order to obtain a more minimal agreement on part of the partner you're threatening. I suppose that's the technique, but at this point we have no guarantee that the buck is going to stop somewhere. You know, when Donald Trump does not refuse to rule out force as a method to annex Greenland, which is what he should have done when asked about it, you know we are still trying to interpret this as that's a tactic. That's the art of the deal, but who's to say? Who has the guarantee now? So what type of uncertainty is he creating by doing that? At least the Danes are deeply worried and deeply offended as well, and overall, this is the kind of mistrust that he's voluntarily creating with his allies.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Yeah, you're talking about when Trump was asked whether he would rule out military or force or economic, and he refused to rule out either.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Macron obviously had this big meeting on Monday, where he gathered on very short notice a lot of European leaders for an emergency meeting after the statements that were made both at the NATO defense meeting last week and in the Munich Security Conference, and he's having another meeting today.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Actually, I think as we're speaking, they have a visual conference in which they brought in many more Eastern European countries, including countries that are neighboring on or near neighbors of Russia so also Canada, by the way Also Canada very important. So what can Europeans do if the US is increasingly backing away from a support of Ukraine and potentially even withdraws support for Europe in terms of troops or strategic intelligence logistics? I mean, those are things that take many years to build. It's not just investment of money, it's building whole systems, because there are things that the US has provided that I don't believe Europe is really ready to immediately step in on. So I don't know if those are the level of questions they're dealing with in these emergency meetings online today. But first of all, are you hearing anything from your perch in Paris and what do you believe they can do these leaders' meetings?

Celia Belin:

So in these leaders' meetings, the importance is to try to come up with a form of a consensus, and the consensus was, and emerged from it, that there would be no acceptance of a dry ceasefire without negotiating a peace deal, meaning that Russia has to make concessions, has to also demonstratively show that if it wants a peace deal, it has to offer some guarantees to Ukraine. That's number one. Number two that Europeans were ready to put effort and potentially troops on the ground and to be part of the solution within those negotiations. I think they send that signal to the negotiating team of the Trump administration when negotiating with Russians, in order for them to know that if they want to make a good deal, they have to take at heart European and Ukrainian interests and in that case they will have some contributions from Europeans and from Ukrainians.

Celia Belin:

The third point that came out of it is a collective decision to ramp up defense production. So, yes, it's not going to happen overnight. That part is not going to happen overnight. It's not going to happen overnight. That part is not going to happen overnight. But you also have to realize that the US can threaten all they want or be disruptive as they want, if they do pull out entirely of Europe or if they do, you know, engage in a trade war with Europe etc. Are going to damage themselves. First and foremost, they would damage their own prosperity. A trade war with Europe would be catastrophic for the US economy on top of the European economy. If they were to pull out all troops, they would weaken their strategic advantage all over the world, including when it comes to other fronts, etc. So the military would probably not be happy about this.

Celia Belin:

They have to sell their weapons somewhere. They have a huge defense industry and Europeans are the one buying a lot of these weapons. You know the US needs Europe a lot. It's not just Europe needing the US and there's some decisions or some. You know Europeans need to demonstrate or to remind the US that they need them. Maybe he needs, you know, president Trump needs a little reminding, but ultimately, I think Europeans, european leaders, by showing consensus, by showing some strength, by showing that they can put something on the table but they can also retaliate, want to demonstrate that they need to be taken into account, and if they're not taken into account, there's going to be consequences. So I think it might appear not enough, but it was a show of force from.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Europeans to do these two meetings, and I guess the other question is who would be present? I mean, there's the famous Kissinger line on if I want to talk to Europe, who do I call? The field has been winnowed down with the EU, but are they also discussing, I guess, how and in what form their participation would take?

Celia Belin:

No, I haven't heard that part and I think it's just slightly too early. No one wants to be the Trump whisperer at this time. I think the idea is to go collective, yeah, and messaging to the administration that Europe has interest, that Europe has power, that Europe will not just lie there and be walked all over.

J. Alex Tarquinio:

Messaging was very important as well. Well, that's an excellent note for us to wrap up our conversation on. Thank you again for making time for us today in the Delegates Lounge. Thank you, Alex, it was really great to speak with you again.

Frank Radford:

And that's it from the Delegates Lounge. We'd like to thank our esteemed guests, who've graciously allowed us to share their hard-earned insights into what really matters. And then there's you, our listeners, who we hope are sufficiently edified to clamour for more of the same. Do drop in for a weekly episode on Thursday, or, from time to time if we're on the road, for special events, in which case there'll be a bonus episode. Subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts and, if you like what you've heard, please take a moment to rate or review the show, as it helps others who share your abiding interest in world affairs to find their way to the Delegates Lounge. You can connect with us on many popular social media platforms or reach out to us directly at infothedelicatesloungecom. We're a small team so we can't respond to every message, but we will read them. Our show this week was written and produced by the host and by yours truly executive producer, frank Radford. Until next time, keep calm and curious.